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Summary
This paper explores a connection between religion and politics in Croatia by 
analyzing the conservative civic initiative “In the Name of the Family” (U ime 
obitelji). It is a part of a broader religious-political movement, which emerged 
over the course of the last decade, that is connected to other international con-
servative organizations and initiatives. They advocate for a decrease of secular 
influence on the family, oppose sexual and reproductive rights, and insist on 
the primacy of religious freedoms. The political nature of the movement mani-
fests itself through multiple attempts to scrap the legislation and practices of 
both state and private institutions that are contradicting the value system of the 
Christian (Catholic) majority. The religious-political nexus of the movement 
is confirmed by its continuous involvement in policy-making, here manifested 
through the use of direct democracy institutes.
Keywords: Religious-Political Movement, Contentious Politics, Opportunity 
Structure, Referendum, Same-Sex Marriage
Introduction
The referendum on the constitutional definition of marriage as a union between a 
man and a woman,1 held in December 2013, was the first successful national refe-
rendum in Croatia initiated by a citizens’ initiative. “In the Name of the Family” 
(U ime obitelji) argued that the traditional values of Croatian society must be pro-
tected through enshrining the traditional, heteronormative, definition of family. The 
1 The same definition already existed in the Family Law, but the referendum initiative claimed 
it was necessary to constitutionalize the definition, as in this case it cannot be amended through 
a simple majority voting procedure, but amending the definition, once it is part of the constitu-
tional text, required a so-called organic majority, i.e. two thirds of all Members of Parliament 
(hereinafter MPs).
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religious-political movement leaders, in public debates in the period prior to the re-
ferendum, argued they are not homophobes and that their intention is not to restrict 
the rights of the LGBT* community.2 On the other side, the liberal part of civil so-
ciety, gathered in the initiative “Citizens Vote Against” (Građani glasaju PROTIV), 
was taken aback by the establishment of the religious-political movement and its 
claims.3 The referendum results proved that citizens can be successfully mobilized 
on their social conservative value orientations, since 66 percent of those who voted 
backed the initiative to restrict marriage to heterosexual unions.4
Thus, by initiating the constitutional referendum, the citizens’ initiative “In the 
Name of the Family” had shed a light on a societal cleavage between the liberal and 
conservative-nationalist segments of the society, revealing not only that the Cro-
atian society is socially conservative, but that it also manifests a high level of in-
tolerance and homophobia. The referendum initiative effectively established the 
movement and its prominent figures as new political actors, who have managed to 
secure a significant political capital and power.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the first, theoretical part, the paper 
will present two social movement concepts: the political process theory and the the-
ory of contentious politics. They shall allow us to establish which political opportu-
nities contributed to an emergence and rise of the religious-political movement, as 
well as to explain the indigenous organizational strength of the moment, the mobi-
lizing structures and cultural framing processes the movement applied, and how the 
movement has developed its contentious repertoire.
After a short overview of methods, we synthesize the findings of the interviews 
conducted in the field, and connect the findings with the relevant academic litera-
ture. In the conclusion, we synthesize our findings and determine if a repertoire of 
contention that pursues institutional avenues of social change can be considered a 
successful tool in contentious politics.
2 They argued that the LGBT* citizens are already endowed with an array of rights in accor-
dance to the Croatian legislation that was regulating same-sex partnerships at that time.
3 There were no indications that the government was planning to legalize gay marriage. It only 
announced the intention to amend the Same-Sex Civil Union Act passed in 2003, by expanding 
the rights of same-sex partners. Issues of equality and prohibition of discrimination for this, tra-
ditionally activist-oriented and, until recently, prevalent segment of the civil society, were con-
sidered not only as enshrined in the legislation, but also as widely embraced and consolidated in 
the hearts and minds of the citizens.
4 The constitutional ban on same-sex marriage has not, however, prevented the passing of a 
new legal framework for same-sex couples, as the centre-left ruling coalition, along with several 
other leftist and centrist MPs, passed the Same-Sex Life-Partnership Law in July 2014, equating 
a same-sex life-partnership to a heteronormative marriage in all rights and obligations, except 
the access to adoption.
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Framing the Theory on Social Movements
Social movements are “rational attempts by excluded groups to mobilize suffi-
cient political leverage to advance collective interests through noninstitutionalized 
means” (McAdam, 1982: 37), as well as “collective challenges to existing arrange-
ments of power and distribution by people with common purposes and solidarities, 
in sustained interaction with elites, opponents and authorities” (Meyer and Tarrow, 
1998: 4). Research on religion and politics “highlighted the role of religious or-
ganizations in the mobilization of various movements and the ways in which reli-
gious resources and institutions have been appropriated by movements with secular 
goals” (Aminzade and Perry, 2001: 115). Keddie (1998: 697) argues that religious-
political mass movements either argue in favor of religious nationalism, or promote 
conservative religious politics. Whereas a mission of the first category of religious-
political movements is directed primarily against other religious communities, the 
second type is directed primarily against internal enemies.5 Applying Keddie’s ter-
minology, a religious-political movement turns into a political actor by responding 
to disillusionment with secular government whom they perceive as incapable of 
representing properly its value system.
Aminzade and Perry (2001: 160-161) argue that “[t]he central way in which 
religious-based political movements differ from secular ones concerns claims to an 
other-worldly, transcendental ontology. [...] The issue is not whether such a super-
natural world actually exists. As long as people believe it does and act accordingly, 
invisible spirits can shape political life.” Religious politics is a term that refers “to 
any social interaction that relates beliefs regarding sacred objects to the interests and 
actions of a political community” (Chow, 2012). Religious-political movements, 
like any other social movement, tend to result in a social change that redistributes 
power (McCarthy and Zald, 1977: 1217-1218; Tarrow, 1998: 4-6; Meyer and Tar-
row, 1998: 4), and, obviously, the nature of a collective claim-making which defines 
their contention challenge might also be political. Consequently, along with ideo-
logical messages, religious-political movements convey political messages as well.
In order to be able to explain the emergence of the Croatian religious-political 
social movement we opted for theoretical concepts that allow the study of social 
movements in a broader economic and political context and that take into account 
political opportunities, mobilizing structures, framing processes, protest cycles, and 
contentious repertoires (Caren, 2007; McAdam, 1982).
5 The latter is the case with the movement researched in this paper, as this movement appeals 
to a religious tradition, which is evoked as a means of solving problems exacerbated by secular 
government; applies populist rhetoric in attempting to gain political power; and predominantly 
advocates conservative and traditional social views.
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The Political Process and the Contentious Politics Approaches 
to Understanding Social Movements
The political process (or political opportunity) approach, developed by McAdam 
(1982), introduced a challenge of the political opportunity structure and the insti-
tutional political power as the context of social movements’ political action. By 
focusing on political opportunity structure and context, the political process ap-
proach places analytical attention “to the contours and dynamics of the wider soci-
ety in which the movements operate” (Williams, 2000: 95). A recipe for insurgency, 
explained by the political process perspective, is made from the following three 
factors: political opportunities, indigenous organizational strength, and cognitive 
liberation. The concept of opportunity structure can be described as the threatened 
interests of governments and other groups to the actions of a challenger pursuing 
the group’s interests (Tilly, 1978: 11). It could also be seen as the “consistent – but 
not necessarily formal or permanent – dimensions of the political environment that 
provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their ex-
pectations for success or failure” (Tarrow, 1994: 85).
The political opportunity structures is the basic idea of the framework as ex-
actly this influences “the choice of protest strategies and the impact of social move-
ments on their environment’’ (Kitschelt, 1986: 58). Similarly, political opportunities 
result from “any event or broad social process that serves to undermine the calcu-
lations and assumptions on which the political establishment is structured” (Mc-
Adam, 1982: 41).
In addition to changes in the political opportunity structure, the political pro-
cess theory takes into account organizational strength and insurgent conscious-
ness as reasons for the emergence of collective action. Indigenous organizational 
strength presupposes the pre-existence of political and potentially political organi-
zations that existed among the aggrieved community. Finally, cognitive liberation 
among potential social movement participants emerges out of perceived illegitima-
cy of the current political system, convincing the participants in the social move-
ment they are able to contribute to a meaningful social change (Tilly, 1978: 135; 
McAdam, 1982: 38).
A proponent of the political process approach Sidney Tarrow (1994: 1) argues 
that social movements are “triggered by the incentives created by political oppor-
tunities, combining conventional and challenging forms of action and building on 
social networks and cultural frames”. Tarrow furthermore argues (1998: 71) “that 
contention is more closely related to opportunities for and limited by constraints 
upon collective action than by the persistent social or economic factors that people 
experience”. However, “changing opportunities must be seen alongside more stable 
structural elements like the strength or weakness of the state and the forms of re-
pression it habitually employs” (ibid.).
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Tarrow, thus, recognizes an opportunity as a crucial variable in the emergence 
of social protest, emphasizing that social movements are both able to seize pre-ex-
isting opportunities, but also envisage a strategy that will allow them to create new 
opportunities in which they will increase their power. Tarrow claims that along with 
politics, i.e., political opportunities, two additional factors are crucial for explain-
ing “[h]ow movements become the focal points for collective action and sustain 
it against opponents and the state” (1994: 189): mobilizing structures and cultural 
frames. Of the two, the one more important for our research is the concept of mo-
bilizing structures. They are resources, which “bring people together in the field, 
shape coalitions, confront opponents, and assure their own future after the exhilara-
tion of the peak of mobilization has passed” (Tarrow, 1998: 123).
The political process approach was expanded and consolidated by the concept 
of contentious politics. Tarrow (2011: 16) argues that “contentious politics emerges 
in response to changes in political opportunities and threats when participants per-
ceive and respond to a variety of incentives: material and ideological, partisan- and 
group-based, long-standing and episodic”. McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly define con-
tentious politics as “episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims 
and their objects when (a) at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, 
or a party to the claims and (b) the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of 
at least one of the claimants” (2001: 5). In contentious politics, a variety of interac-
tions takes place among a multitude of contenders. Consequently, the outcome of 
interactions among groups of challengers and between them and authorities is de-
monstrated through a dynamic of the cycle (Tarrow, 2012: 201).
Since the nature of the contentious politics is dynamic and interactive (Mc-
Adam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001: 73), Tarrow holds that the best way to conceptual-
ize it is to observe it as a process (2012: 200). He claims that “people engage in 
contentious politics when patterns of political opportunities and constraints change, 
and then by strategically employing a repertoire of collective action, creating new 
opportunities, which are used by others in widening cycles of contention” (Tarrow, 
2011: 28-29). Therefore, a successful cycle of contention can be explained through 
four elements of the contentious politics: (i) the expansion of the political oppor-
tunity structure; (ii) the construction of contention; (iii) networks and mobilizing 
structures; and (iv) the repertoire of contention (Tarrow, 1998; Tilly, 1978).
Methods of Research
In order to establish which societal trends favored the emergence of religious poli-
tics in Croatia we draw upon the political opportunity approach that argues that a 
causal significance of political opportunities is prevalent for a social movement to 
emerge, and that collective action needs to be studied by the systematic cataloguing 
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and analysis of contentious events (Tilly, 1978: 41-85; McAdam, 1982). Further-
more, we were interested in establishing what the motivation behind choosing le-
gal mobilization as a means of pursuing a movement’s goals is. We will, therefore, 
explain why legal norms were deployed by the religious-political movement as the 
movement’s repertoire of contention. In this way, we will show that legal norms 
might play an important role not only in the inception of the social movement, but 
also in its recruitment and the building of its organizational resources, as well as in 
the mobilization and demobilization of its constituents.
In order to explore the growth of a conservative religious-political movement 
in Croatia, the referendum initiative that resulted in the constitutional amendment 
on the definition of marriage, and the ways in which institutions might be deployed 
as means of achieving social change, we used in-depth interviews. By conducting 
ten semi-structured in-depth interviews, with scholars and civil society activists 
from both the liberal and conservative spectrum of Croatian civil society, we ma-
naged to collect data on the social movement repertoire. We were interested in their 
opinion about the rise of conservative activism in Croatia. We especially focused 
on understanding their intention to define marriage through the Constitution. We 
also wanted to understand how changes to the legal and institutional framework 
contributed to the referendum initiative that demanded the valorization of the con-
servative-Catholic values in the constitutional text. In the end, we wanted to know 
all we could about the possibility that the referendum initiatives served as a means 
for positioning new political actors in the realm of Croatian politics.
The ten interviewees were researchers and scholars (4), representatives of libe-
ral civil society organizations (3), and representatives of conservative civil society 
organizations (3) that form the core of the religious-political movement. We found 
leaders and lawyers of the religious-political movement particularly important as 
interviewees as they had outlined the referendum initiative question and requested 
a review of the lawfulness of governmental decisions on behalf of the movement’s 
organizations. The other respondents’ active participation in Croatian civil society 
or scholarly interest in it has legitimized them as a valuable source of information.
Structure of Religious-Political Actors in Croatia
Mobilization of the religious right emerged in the United States in the 1970s, as 
a response to a plethora of progressive laws (Chow, 2012: 1471; Wilcox and Ro-
binson, 2010; Shields, 2009; Amenta and Caren, 2004; Green, Rozell and Wilcox, 
2003). Afterwards, and as a response to the secularization process in Western Eu-
ropean and in the majority of Central and Eastern European countries (Ančić and 
Zrinščak, 2012: 22; Pickel and Sammet, 2012), the socially conservative organi-
zations demanded the safeguarding of Christian values in the legislation and so-
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cial policies of European institutions and national governments. They framed their 
claims around three sets of ideas: the necessity to preserve traditional family, the 
right to life, and religious liberty (Hodžić and Bijelić, 2015).
The Croatian religious-political movement is comprised of a dozen of con-
servative civil society organizations that came into being over the course of the 
last decade. They promote traditional or Catholic values, advocate for active citi-
zen participation in the society and in politics, pursue pro-life activism and oppose 
abortion; assert that the right to marry and found a family should be solely entrusted 
to one man and one woman; and negate the autonomy of the state to prescribe edu-
cational curricula that touch upon sensitive issues such as contraception, education 
on gender roles, etc.
The first manifestation of a conservative mobilization can be traced back to 
2006, when the association “Voice of Parents for Children” (Glas roditelja za djecu 
– GROZD) openly objected to the introduction of a curriculum for sexual education 
program in schools (Bijelić, 2008). “GROZD” was established to advocate an ab-
stinence-based program, built on the Catholic view on family, sexuality, and gender 
roles. Two other associations, the “Association for a Comprehensive Sex Education 
Teen Star” (Udruga za cjeloviti spolni odgoj Teen star) and the “Reform – Asso-
ciation for the Promotion of Ethics, Morality, Family Values, and Human Rights” 
(Reforma – udruga za promicanje etike, morala, obiteljskih vrijednosti i ljudskih 
prava), have both had Ladislav Ilčić as a connecting, prominent figure. The as-
sociation “Teen Star” promotes a specific program on responsible sexual behavior 
that is offered to teenagers in schools or parishes aiming at the maintenance of the 
virginity of its participants or the discontinuation of sexual activity of previously 
sexually active participants. The “Reform” opposes the introduction of sex educa-
tion in school curricula. The association “Teen Star” is a member of an international 
association “TeenSTAR International” that is associated with the “Natural Family 
Planning Center” in Washington, D.C.
The association “Vigilare” (Latin expression for ‘vigilant, watchful’) is regis-
tered as an association that “promotes citizens’ participation in the civil and politi-
cal sectors of society and the preservation of dignity and rights of the individual, 
family and values of life”. “Vigilare” mostly pursues internet activism, by calling 
its supporters to send emails to politicians and the heads of institutions when they 
believe a violation of traditional values has taken place. By doing so, “Vigilare” 
introduced a form of civic activism that Croatian citizens and institutions were not 
used to.
The citizens’ association “Center for the Renewal of Culture” (Centar za obno-
vu kulture – COK) is established with the goal of educating and training future con-
servative leaders, guided “by the belief that if the culture can be renewed then the 
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political landscape can be healed” (Bartulica, 2013: 22). The Center for the Renew-
al of Culture’s mission resembles the one of the “Center for European Renewal”, 
a pan-European conservative association that describes itself as “an independent, 
non-profit, non-partisan, educational and cultural organization dedicated to promot-
ing and protecting the Western ideal of a civilized, humane, and free society”.
The mission of these conservative civil society organizations is often multiple, 
as some of them, e.g. “GROZD”, “Vigilare”, and the “Center for Natural Family 
Planning”, also present themselves as pro-life advocates. Several other pro-life as-
sociations established the umbrella organization “Croatian Alliance for Life ‘CRO-
VITA’” (Hrvatski savez za život ‘CRO-VITA’), that “brings together associations, 
initiatives, movements, projects and individual members with the idea and imple-
mentation of a primary goal: the protection of endangered or unprotected human 
life and human dignity from conception to natural death”. The “Croatian Alliance 
for Life ‘CRO-VITA’” served in 2013 as a local expository of a European citizens’ 
pro-life initiative “One of Us”, organized and coordinated by the non-profit “Euro-
pean Federation for Life and Human Dignity”.
Apart from advocates of Catholic values and pro-life activists, there is a group 
of conservative civil society organizations that place protection of marriage and tra-
ditional family as the core of their activism. These are the “Association for Promot-
ing Family Values ‘Blessed Alojzije Stepinac’” (Udruga za promicanje obiteljskih 
vrijednosti ‘Blaženi Alojzije Stepinac’), the “Center for Natural Family Plan-
ning” (Centar za prirodno planiranje obitelji), “Family Enrichment” (Obiteljsko 
obogaćivanje), and the “Reform”.
Finally, it is impossible not to acknowledge that all the prominent actors of 
the Croatian religious-political movement had been or are still active first in the 
party “Croatian Growth – HRAST” (Hrvatski rast – HRAST) that was registered 
as a political party in 2010, or in the party “Hrast [meaning ‘oak’] – the Move-
ment for a Successful Croatia” (Hrast – Pokret za uspješnu Hrvatsku) which was 
founded following the break up in the party. In spite of being a political actor, the 
party “Croatian Growth”, founded by several conservative Catholic NGOs, joined 
by several marginal conservative parties, politicians and public intellectuals¸ advo-
cated itself as “a Croatian political movement that brings together political parties, 
civic organizations, civic initiatives, and prominent individuals” that are tradition-
ally conservative.6 Its president was Željka Markić, a leading figure of the conserva-
tive civic initiative “In the Name of the Family”. The party “Hrast – the Movement 
for a Successful Croatia” is led by Ladislav Ilčić, conservative civil society activist 
that emerged through promoting Catholic morals and values in health education and 
6 “Hrvatski rast – Hrast: Vrijednosna programska polazišta”, Portal hrvatskog kulturnog vijeća, 
28 June 2011, at https://www.hkv.hr/izdvojeno/vai-prilozi/ostalo/prilozi-graana/7810-hrast.html.
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later as local politician in the city of Varaždin and then shortly as MP in the Croatian 
Parliament elected from the list of the Croatian Democratic Union in 2015. Whereas 
the first version of “Hrast” ceased to exist, the later party is politically active, and 
is aligned with the European Christian Political Movement and currently has one 
representative in the Parliament.
The citizens’ initiative “In the Name of the Family” arrived on stage once the 
center-left coalition announced its intention to legislatively arrange the rights and 
responsibilities of same-sex partners (such as social and health insurance rights and 
inheritance rights). The initiative “In the Name of the Family” was presented, by its 
(informal) leader Željka Markić, as an initiative that “brings together individuals, 
families and numerous civic organizations aimed at promoting marriage between a 
man and a woman as the fundamental value of the social order and the guarantee 
of the permanent legal protection of children, marriage and family” (Stanić, 2013).
The religious-political movement’s framing process has set the protection of 
the values of the (Catholic) majority and the dominance of the Catholic identity in 
Croatian society through preserving the traditional family as its master frame. Up 
to now, the neo-conservative agenda in Croatia tackled three issues: the protection 
of the traditional family, the resistance to the introduction of sex education, and the 
prohibition of abortion. Such a thematic cluster demonstrates their alignment with 
a wider European neo-conservative agenda.
The first goal of the protection of the traditional family was successfully ar-
ticulated through the citizens’ initiative “In the Name of the Family” that managed 
to include the definition of marriage into the text of the Croatian constitution as a 
union between a man and a woman. In this way they were able to create a consti-
tutional prohibition of same-sex marriage and the impossibility of marriage equal-
ity for LGBT individuals. Amending legislation requires a simple majority of votes 
in the Parliament, whereas amending the Constitution requires three quarters of all 
Parliamentary votes. However, the citizens’ legislative initiative becomes the text of 
the Constitution if in a nation-wide referendum the majority of the votes were cast 
in favour of the referendum initiative. For the initiative to be valid, ten percent of all 
voters in the country need to back it initially. However, in spite of the referendum’s 
success for the citizen initiative “In the Name of the Family”, the conservative civil 
society organizations continue to oppose the Civil Partnership Act. They argue the 
Act is unconstitutional, because it recognizes the same right to the institution of 
civil partnership as the one that is enshrined in the institution of marriage (Radelj, 
2014). Thus, the ideological battles over marriage and the traditional family seem 
far from being over.
Secondly, the religious-political movement objects to the introduction of health 
and civic education programs in school curricula on the grounds that learning about 
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sexuality in elementary and high schools is contrary to parental rights and interests 
of educating their children in accordance with their own value systems. They argue 
that parents should have a freedom to opt for a variant of health education that is in 
line with their parental value system.
Apart from submitting open letters to ministers of social policy or education, 
the “GROZD” and “Reform” associations submitted in December 2013 a proposal 
for a constitutional review of the governmental “Decision on the introduction, mo-
nitoring and evaluation of curriculum implementation of health education in elemen-
tary and high schools”. After the Constitutional Court struck down the provision on 
introduction of health education in elementary and high school curriculum since the 
procedural requirements were not met, a representative of the “GROZD” argued that 
“the [Constitutional] Court recognized what parents, conservative NGO groups, the 
Catholic Church, initiative ‘In the name of the Family’ and other major religions in 
Croatia, had been saying all along – that the Minister of Education had forcibly and 
undemocratically introduced the sex-education program which was a beachhead for 
introducing gender ideology and indoctrinating Croatian children against the will of 
their parents and against article 63 of the Croatian Constitution and other European 
directives and laws which state that parents have the sole responsibility and freedom 
to bring up their children in line with their values” (LifeSite, 2013). Although the 
Constitutional Court had not based its decision on the grounds evoked by the so-
cial movement organizations, but merely on inadequate procedural requirements, the 
movement presented the Constitutional Court’s decision as a victory. The influence 
of conservative actors in the modeling of a future educational curriculum is seen in 
the interest those actors are pursuing in the modeling of the educational reform the 
Ministry of Education has been implementing. Open proponents of the traditional 
and Catholic values have occupied some of the leading positions in the expert team 
for the implementation of the educational reform. Moreover, recent changes in the 
draft Law on Primary and Secondary Education show that the current government 
is willing to take into account parental value preferences by assuring parallel educa-
tional content on topics that might have influence on the formation of personal atti-
tudes, values and behavioral preferences.
The initiative “In the Name of the Family” used the legal mobilization by sub-
mitting a request for a constitutional review of the Family Act after a comprehen-
sive reform of family law was passed in 2014. Interestingly, the constitutionality of 
the Family Act was challenged by a number of organizations and individuals from 
both the liberal and conservative spectrum, and was eventually suspended by the 
Constitutional Court.
The third topic the religious-political movement is pursuing is the protection 
of life from its inception until natural death. One of the first arenas in which the 
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religious-political claims became articulated was the legal regulation on assisted 
human reproduction. For example, in February 2012, representatives of the civic 
initiative “I Was an Embryo Too” (I ja sam bio embrij) formed by the civil society 
organizations “Vigilare” and “Fertility Care” presented a legislative proposal in the 
Croatian Parliament that would contribute to the solution of problems of couples 
with infertility by advocating natural conception and opposing the freezing of em-
bryos for the purpose of artificial insemination. The liberalization of assisted human 
reproduction legislation was put for a vote in July 2013 and was not backed by the 
center-right parties. The Croatian Bishops’ Conference labelled the law “profound-
ly immoral and inhumane, because it will dissolve the fundamental values of fami-
ly and marriage” (Glas Koncila, 2012). Damir Jelić, vice president of the Croatian 
Democratic Union, in that time the biggest opposition party, compared the new law 
to “the human tragedies of the Holocaust and the crimes of the Communist regime” 
(ibid.). Already in July 2012, the citizens’ initiative “I Was an Embryo Too” and 
civil society organization “Vigilare” issued a joint statement in which a retreat to 
the constitutional referendum was mentioned for the first time: “We are left with no 
other option but to take advantage of the rights enshrined by the Croatian Constitu-
tion that endow citizens with the possibility to call a referendum to bring down this 
law. This will certainly be possible because we are no longer a ‘silent majority’. The 
constitutional complaint and the referendum are the last line of defense left to the 
citizens, but our efforts do not end in breach of this bad law” (ibid.).
The social conservative and Catholic associations have recently undertaken a 
number of activities that oppose sexual and reproductive rights that have been le-
galized since the 1970s in Croatia. Interestingly, in the same period the number of 
medical specialists who provide abortions has decreased due to the expression of 
conscientious objection. For example, since 2014, during Lent, prayer vigils under 
the name “40 Days for Life” (40 dana za život) were organized across the country in 
front of public hospitals that perform abortions. The prayer vigils constitute a novel-
ty in the repertoire of civic activism, and are likely inspired by, and imported from, 
American and Western European pro-life initiatives. The prayer vigils in Croatia 
are coordinated by the “International Ecumenical Prayer Initiative for Unborn Life” 
(Međunarodna ekumenska molitvena inicijativa za nerođeni život), which confirms 
international support for this development of the protest repertoire.
The opening up of the pro-life agenda by the organizations belonging to the 
religious-political movement can be explained merely as an import of the foreign 
repertoires, since the legislator has not announced any intention to promote abor-
tion as a contraceptive means, and there were no prior announcements from the 
government to amend any law on reproductive rights. However, there was a pend-
ing constitutional review request of the so-called abortion law from the late 1970s 
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which was rejected by the Constitutional Court in February 2017. Conservative and 
Catholic associations “In the name of the Family”, “Croatian Movement for Life 
and Family” (Hrvatski pokret za život i obitelj) and “Croatian Catholic Congrega-
tion ‘MI’” (Hrvatski katolički zbor ‘MI’) as well as several citizens filed additional 
complaints to the Constitutional Court to back the original constitutional review 
request.
Thus, the movement, similarly to its organization of the Constitutional refe-
rendum on the definition of marriage, is acting preemptively, by trying to restrict 
the potential liberalization of the reproductive rights. This particular issue was an-
nounced back in 2013 as the movement’s future attempts to transform the legal sys-
tem, since Krešimir Miletić, one of the leaders of the religious-political movement, 
stated that “discussion on all relevant issues in society shall be opened, including 
the one on the law on abortion that was passed during the Communist rule” (Ćurić, 
2013).
Interestingly, in pursuing all these topics, the conservative civil society acti-
vists consistently use human rights discourse for the legitimization of their claims. 
Human rights discourse, referencing to pluralism and democratic principles and 
values, has been widely used as a repertoire of contention by conservative organi-
zations and movements in the Western world.7 One of our interviewees considered 
that “the discourse of human rights, normally used by the left-liberal organization, 
made them distinctive, even putting them farther away from the Church, which is 
traditional, conservative”. Secondly, they are claiming a concept of human rights 
as a reasoning discourse. For example, they manipulate the legal discourse and in-
terpret the right of the parents to decide on the way in which sexuality and gender 
equality will be taught to their children, the right to marriage equality, the right to 
free and autonomous decisions regarding one’s reproductive life, and the freedom 
of religious conviction to fit Catholic teaching and values. Moreover, in the country 
that has a significant share of self-declared Catholic believers (almost 80% accord-
ing to the 2011 Census) the religious-political movement claims the legitimacy of 
representing the moral, Catholic majority.
7 In her research of the Christian right, Jennifer S. Butler (2006) noted, for example, that the 
Christian right social movement uses liberal procedures and rights, supported by human rights 
treaties and declarations, to advance conservative and restrictive policies. Cynthia Burack (2008) 
demonstrated that the Christian right uses the notion of pluralism, that diversity is a social good 
which prevents dominance of one particular idea, for its own political purposes against the les-
bian, gay, bi-sexual and transgender (LGBT) community.
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Discussion
The Expansion of Political Opportunity Structure: 
Lowered Referendum Requirements
The Croatian Constitution was amended in advance to Croatia’s accession to the 
European Union on 1 July 2013. Originally, the Constitution required that more 
than half of all registered voters vote in favor of the referendum question in order 
for the referendum to be valid. Political elites, being realistic that in a climate of 
significant voter apathy, the turnout would not satisfy that requirement, abolished 
the threshold for a nation-wide referendum (Butković, 2017; Gardašević, 2015; 
Horvat-Vuković, 2014). Moreover, the Constitution contains a provision that the 
Parliament needs to call a referendum on proposals to amend the Constitution when 
ten percent of the total electorate of the country request so and that decisions made 
in the referendum are binding.
Željka Markić, the religious-political movement’s informal leader, stated that 
the initiative’s activity was motivated by the French movement “The Protest for 
Everyone” (La Manif Pour Tous), who organized a massive march in Paris against 
same-sex marriage in November 2012. Markić argued: “having learned from the 
events in France, where millions of people have come out to the streets to send a 
message to President Holland that they do not accept equating the same-sex rela-
tionships and marriage, we think that it is good to resolve such an important is-
sue peacefully, through the democratic process open to all Croatian citizens” 
(Ciglenečki, 2013).
The interviews with other representatives of the religious-political movement 
confirmed our starting assumption that they recognized the change in the referen-
dum legislation as an opportunity structure. One of the respondents said that one 
local referendum8 served as inspiration. Realizing that requirements for local re-
ferenda are much harsher than those for a national one, the religious-political ac-
tors decided to seize the opportunity, knowing the success in referendum both le-
gitimizes their claims and makes them legally binding, as well as hard to overturn. 
The movement relied on the referendum as a model of participatory democracy, 
knowing that citizens would recognize it as a response to diminished opportunities 
8 The civic initiative “Srđ is Ours” (Srđ je naš) mobilized in April 2013 the residents of Dub-
rovnik to oppose the construction of a golf resort on the plateau Srđ above Dubrovnik, by call-
ing for a local referendum. Though the initiative managed to collect a sufficient number of sup-
porting signatures to call for the referendum, the referendum failed, since less than 50 percent of 
voters in Dubrovnik voted. Namely, only 31.5% of voters showed up at polling stations when the 
referendum was held, whereas the Law on Referendum set a threshold of more than a half of the 
total number of registered voters.
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to participate in the policy-making processes. The movement thus recognized the 
niche of political dissatisfaction of voters, who were demonstrating their distrust in 
mainstream political institutions by electing not to vote at various elections.9 This 
provided another opportunity for success of the referendum initiative, as they need-
ed to mobilize just a certain percentage of citizens willing to cast their vote, as there 
was no threshold for the results to be binding.
The citizen initiative “In the Name of the Family” managed to collect 749,31610 
signatures in a two-week period in May 2013. The initiative was supported by con-
servative political parties (both parliamentary and non-parliamentary ones), the 
Catholic Church and the majority of other religious communities. The ruling left-
wing coalition opposed the amendment, along with numerous liberal human rights 
organizations and the majority of Croatian media. The Constitutional Court did not 
discuss the constitutionality of the referendum question, because the Croatian Par-
liament did not request it from the Court.
The constitutional referendum was held on 1 December 2013 and 37.9% of eli-
gible voters voted. The State Election Commission announced that 65.87% voted 
Yes, 33.51% voted No, and 0.57% of ballots were invalid.
However, this was not the only referendum initiative by the citizens’ initiative 
“In the Name of the Family”. The political nature of its activism was confirmed first 
in 2014, once the initiative started to collect signatures for a referendum to change 
the electoral system, and then in 2015 when “In the Name of the Family – Project 
Homeland” (U ime obitelji – projekt Domovina) registered as a political party and 
run in parliamentary elections that year, though without securing any seat. In 2014 
the initiative attempted to change both the Constitution and electoral legislation in 
order to introduce preferential voting, so that voters, and not party leaders, would 
have a dominant influence on the candidates elected. Under the slogan “Let Us 
Elect Deputies by Name” (Birajmo zastupnike imenom i prezimenom), the petition 
was signed by 380,649 voters,11 almost half the number the initiative gathered for 
the first referendum. The lower number of citizens supporting this initiative can be 
explained by the fact that all parliamentary political parties, including the largest, 
9 For example, the voter turnout at the local elections held in May 2013 was merely 13.55% in 
average (State Electoral Commission of the Republic of Croatia, 2013). The voter turnout at the 
European Parliament elections held in May 2014 was 25.24% (State Electoral Commission of 
the Republic of Croatia, 2014a). The last presidential elections held in December 2014, however, 
witness an increase of participation, as the turnout was 47.12% in the first round and 59.05% in 
the second round (State Electoral Commission of the Republic of Croatia, 2014b).
10 They needed just above 400,000 signatures for the initiative to be successful.
11 The Constitutional Court found in December 2014 the initiative had not managed to collect a 
sufficient number of signatures to initiate the second referendum, as the Court established that in 
order to call for a referendum 404,252 signatures were required.
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the Croatian Democratic Union, which was openly supportive of the first referen-
dum initiative, were against the second initiative. However, popular support for the 
initiative’s idea signaled political parties that citizens do favour preferential voting. 
The amendments of electoral legislation from February 2015 resulted in letting vot-
ers endorse one particular candidate from the party list in 2015 and 2016 parliamen-
tary elections.
Other opportunity structures recognized by the religious-political movement 
were the public’s high level of dissatisfaction with mainstream politics, and wor-
sened economic situation. In a country that has widespread corruption12 and sub-
stantial distrust in political institutions,13 people turned to new forms of political 
activism that appears un-compromised and voices concerns over traditional values. 
The lack of trust in political institutions puts at risk the willingness of citizens to 
back new public policies (in the Croatian context those were the centre-left govern-
ment’s Minister of Public Administration announcements on the alignment of same-
sex couples’ rights and responsibilities to those of any other married couple, and the 
introduction of health and civic education in the school curriculum). In addition, 
an on-going economic crisis, which in the case of Croatia lasted for more than six 
years, and the austerity measures that followed, contributed to the unpopularity of 
the government.
The Construction of Contention: Framing the Family in Danger
Tarrow (2011: 120) argues that the social movements “do not invent forms of con-
tention out of whole cloth but instead innovate within and around culturally embed-
ded repertoires”. The religious-political movement had managed to gain support for 
its goal by using the concept of family, not heterosexual marriage, as their central 
frame. Our interviewee adds: “this was a matter of representation of values of the 
whole society. I think that people were not thinking only about marriage, as a defi-
nition. They didn’t want to interpret it as a mere legal scope, but as a fight for what 
you believe in and what proved to be the right thing throughout history. This means 
that the family is the best place to raise children. Unfortunately, legal options were 
such, sense and simplicity in the presentation requires simplicity in question.”
The literature on social movements suggests emotions might play a key role 
in mobilization processes (Aminzade and McAdam, 2001; Goodwin, Jasper, and 
12 Data of the 2013 Global Corruption Barometer, a public opinion survey on views and experi-
ences of corruption, revealed that 72% of respondents in Croatia felt that political parties were 
corrupt or extremely corrupt, whereas 63% of respondents held that the parliament was corrupt 
or extremely corrupt (Transparency International, 2013).
13 Political parties, the parliament and the government are the least trusted institutions according 
to many recent surveys (Budak and Rajh, 2012).
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Polletta, 2001; Summers-Effler, 2002). Indeed, citizens who expressed their sup-
port for the initiative were mobilized through the use of emotions, as the initiative 
systematically framed saving the endangered family and endangered values as a 
goal of their activism. It was visible from choosing the initiative’s name (“In the 
Name of the Family”), through using arguments that the family is the best place for 
raising children, to claiming that children who live in families with one biological 
parent or with homosexual parents are necessarily sexually, emotionally and physi-
cally abused.
At the outset of the initiative’s activities, its informal leader, Željka Markić, 
stated that the referendum has been chosen as a means of action, “in order to en-
sure that something so fundamental for a society as marriage, and thus the family, 
and all the rights arising from marriage, such as the adoption of children, cannot be 
changed just by changing the Family Act or any other law” (Stanić, 2013). More-
over, Markić repeatedly stated that referendum was chosen as the initiative’s activi-
ty since the organizers expected “the referendum to ensure constitutional protection 
of marriage as a union between a woman and a man, and to show to the politicians, 
both in the present and subsequent Governments, what is Croatian society’s view on 
such important issues as marriage, family and adoption” (Ciglenečki, 2013).
Part of the public was most likely deceived by the alleged scientific data the 
movement provided, including through public lectures by Judith Reisman, an 
American academic and social conservative activist who denounces the work of 
sociologist Alfred Kinsey. In her lectures in February 2013, delivered at the Faculty 
of Political Science and the Faculty of Philosophy in Zagreb, as well as in the Cro-
atian Parliament, Reisman attacked sex education and gay rights as an anti-family 
and pedophile-friendly agenda. Željka Markić often asserted that so-called Texas 
Research proved that the children living with homosexual parents are “on average 
at a significant disadvantage when compared to children raised by the intact fami-
ly of their married, biological mother and father” (Regnerus, 2012). The latter re-
search has been denounced by the Croatian Sociological Association, which stated 
this academic research was incorrect and biased (Croatian Sociological Associa-
tion, 2013). But the members of the religious-political movement were undeterred. 
Vice John Batarelo, for example, stated that “it has been empirically proven that 
where you have a happy marriage and a happy family – there children are more suc-
cessful, happier, more ambitious” (Hudelist, 2013).
Moreover, the initiative wisely used emotions, in public addresses and appear-
ances of its leaders as well as in its campaign (e.g. by using a silhouette of a family 
with mother and father holding hands with their children as the central logo of the 
referendum campaign, or by picturing a happy young family with a small child as 
the web identity of the “GROZD” association). An example of emotional manipula-
Petričušić, A., Čehulić, M., Čepo, D., Gaining Political Power by Utilizing Opportunity Structures...
77
tion was a poster of a girl who allegedly fell asleep in the drawing of her deceased 
mother, she drew herself on the street. The media discovered that the message the 
picture asserted was fake, as it was an artistic photo taken by an Iranian photogra-
pher of one of her nieces (V.Š. and R.J., 2013).
Networks and Mobilizing Structures: Interconnectedness of Conservative Actors
Tarrow (2011: 123-124) argues that it is possible to distinguish among three dif-
ferent meanings of movement organization: the organization of collective action at 
the point of contact with opponents usually controlled by one formal organization 
or a coalition of organizations; the advocacy organization which either promotes or 
resists social change; and “the connective structures or interpersonal networks that 
link leaders and followers, centers and peripheries, and different parts of a move-
ment sector with one another, permitting coordination and aggregation, and allow-
ing movements to persist even when formal organization is lacking”. In addition, 
he argues that social movements depend on three levels of organization: “the social 
networks at their base, the organization of collective action, and some degree of for-
mal organization” (ibid.: 183). The third meaning of movement organization, i.e. the 
one that asserts the interpersonal networks between movement leaders, as well as 
the first level of movement organization, i.e the social network, constitute the main 
connective structure of the Croatian religious-political movement. Representatives 
of liberal civil society gathered in the campaign “Citizens vote against!” argued that 
behind the citizens’ initiative “In the Name of the Family” is actually “one mar-
ginal political option”, i.e. the conservative political party “Hrast” (Građani glasaju 
PROTIV, 2013). Similar messages were voiced in articles on portals and in maga-
zines that were not sympathetic to the idea of the constitutional referendum (R.I., 
2013).
It is impossible not to acknowledge that the movement is represented by just 
a few individuals that reappear in a dozen conservative civil society organizations, 
sometimes even being formally connected to the institutions of the Catholic Church. 
Željka Markić, as an informal leader of “In the Name of the Family”, was the former 
president of the political party “Hrast”. Ladislav Ilčić, president of the party “Hrast” 
at the moment of the referendum, was the former president of the civil society or-
ganization “GROZD”. Krešimir Planinić, who is the legal councilor of the citizen’s 
initiative “In the Name of the Family” is, through his wife, associated with the or-
ganization “Mary’s Meals”14. Krešimir Miletić, at the time associated with the as-
sociation “Vigilare”, is also the president of the “Association for Promoting Family 
14 The civil society organization Mary’s Meals Croatia (Marijini obroci) is a branch of the inter-
national charity organization Mary’s Meals “that aims at providing a proper meal to the children 
in the world’s poorest countries every school day”.
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Values ‘Blessed Alojzije Stepinac’”, a member of the “Croatian Marriage and Fami-
ly Alliance CRO-BIOS”, and a former member of the party “Hrast”. Vice Batarelo, 
who is the president of the association “Vigilare”, used to be head of the Office for 
the Pastoral Care of the Family of the Archdiocese of Zagreb. S. Bartulica, who is 
the president of the citizens’ association “Center for the Renewal of Culture”, used 
to serve as advisor to the former President Ivo Josipović on religious issues.
The interviewees from the conservative civil society organizations claimed 
they had not been initially coordinated and acquainted with each other. On the con-
trary, they argued that shared values and interest brought them together, and as a re-
sult of that they are acquaintances and friends today. Indeed, interpersonal networks 
that exist among the movement’s leaders (a dozen of associations and civil society 
organizations often share personnel in governing boards and bodies) are the driving 
force behind the movement’s identity development.
The interviewees from liberal civil society argued the leaders of the religious-
political movement are closely related to the Catholic Church. However, the in-
terviewees from the conservative civil society organizations repeatedly articulated 
that the nature of their initiative is non-confessional and apolitical, but neverthe-
less seeks partners across religious boundaries, and presented themselves as acting 
across religious divides. The proclamation of a non-confessional character of the ini-
tiative managed to increase participation opportunities to almost all religious com-
munities. Such an outlook indeed had a strategic effect, as the initiative managed 
to mobilize support for a referendum on the definition of marriage of the Catholic 
Church, but also of other major religious communities.
Repertoire of Contention: the Role and Power of Law and Politics
The Croatian religious-political movement uses the rhetoric of human rights, acts 
within the institutional framework, and relies on democratic tools such as the refe-
rendum. It transmitted conservative values mainly through institutional means, pri-
marily through the attempt to influence the drafting of legislation and by addressing 
judicial institutions, predominantly the Constitutional Court, for a judicial review 
of the constitutionality of legislative provisions, but also, as it was shown above, by 
initiating the referendum. Such a repertoire of contention constitutes an exception 
to traditional social movement activities. The Croatian case demonstrates the ability 
to play within the existing framework and to use its norms strategically.
For example, the movement relied twice already on the institution of the civic 
referendum; and it addressed the Constitutional Court to decide on the conform-
ity of regulations with the Constitution and to review the constitutionality of le-
gislation. Reliance on the courts and referenda presents an organized effort to re-
sist changes in the structure of the society. However, if law is to serve as an instru-
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ment of social change, it necessarily requires the engagement of legal profession-
als who are associated with the movement and thus, as our interviewee points out, 
“(...) gaining credibility and seriousness. They have shown that they are serious 
people who acknowledge the rule of law – they are institutionalists; they respect the 
system and use everything at their disposal, but at the same time indicate that they 
want to change the system, the game rules.” By assuring the involvement of legal 
professionals, this relatively cheap repertoire of contention which legitimized the 
claims of the movement, not only before the authorities, but also in the wider pub-
lic, increased the power of the Croatian religious-political movement.
Conclusion
Social movements challenge the behavior or the legitimacy of specific social or 
political actors by engaging people who wish to redirect power. When political in-
teractions occur between authorities and social movements that wish to impose tra-
ditional or religious values by challenging the political structure, the nature of such 
movements is religious-political. At the outset of this research we detected that the 
Croatian religious-political movement shares a number of features with social con-
servative movements arising and acting globally. The Croatian religious-political 
movement, similarly to its counterparts abroad, uses religious identity and values as 
a fuel for social change. Subsequently, by analyzing the roots, the evolution, and the 
goals of the religious-political movement that promotes social conservative values 
in Croatia, we established a relation between contentious politics and social change.
Our central goal was to reveal how the religious-political movement managed 
to utilize opportunity structures to leverage political power. We detected three dis-
tinct opportunities that were available to the movement. First, a crucial change in 
the referendum legislation, which generated a favorable political context for the 
religious-political movement to seize a political opportunity. The second oppor-
tunity was the deep distrust in mainstream politics, as well as the economic crisis, 
as instigators of change that were conducive to the claims of the religious-political 
movement. Supporters of the religious-political movement perceived it as an uncor-
rupted actor. Third, the leaders of “In the Name of the Family” had been stressing 
that their initiative was not Catholic, but was non-confessional, and that they are 
acting merely as citizens concerned about the society’s moral downfall.
The theoretical approach we opted for required the identification of the move-
ment’s social and political adversaries, and the change in the structure of political op-
portunity; the movement’s framing processes; the movement’s network and organi-
zation; and a repertoire of contention that used referencing to law. We established 
that contentious politics can be used for the positioning of a novel political actor. 
We demonstrated that the movement organized the contention through the frame 
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of the endangered traditional family and values, though the family was not a mat-
ter of constitutional referendum at all. The movement’s capacity for contention was 
strengthened by an impressive organization of volunteers and supporters who were 
willing to collect the signatures needed to initiate the referendum. The central organi-
zational strength was positioned in the closely connected movement’s leadership. 
The movement’s leadership secured not only the internal organization of the activi-
ties, but also represented the movement’s claims in media and in public. Although 
the interpersonal networks of the leaders served as the basic organizational structure 
of the religious-political movement, the support of some political parties, as well as 
of the Catholic Church, significantly contributed to the organizational strengths of 
the movement in the cycle of contention described above. The leadership had opted 
to use the strategy of referring to legislative provisions, particularly those on human 
rights, their interpretation, and to address judicial institutions (particularly the Con-
stitutional Court) as the chief repertoire of contention. By using legal discourse as 
the repertoire of contention, the social movement entrepreneurs managed to position 
the movement as a credible and legitimate new political actor.
Groups and initiatives that advocate socially conservative and religious values 
have been on the rise both in Europe and in Croatia. They act in response to legis-
lative amendments that “threaten” traditional family values by legalizing same-sex 
marriage, or by recognizing the right to adoption for homosexual partners, or by intro-
ducing educational curricula that are deemed contrary to parental value systems. As 
such, this is an issue that will be a major political cleavage in contemporary societies.
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